Carbungco v. Amparo
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a forcible entry and detainer case initiated by Ambrosio Carbungco against Vicenta Foz. Carbungco, the owner of premises at 1775 and 1777 Andalucia Street, Sampaloc, Manila, sought possession after the original lessee vacated. Foz, claiming to have received the premises as a sublease, refused to vacate, leading to legal action. 2. Procedural History: The case began in the Municipal Court of Manila, where a default judgment was rendered against Foz for failure to appear or answer. Foz appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the appeal, Foz failed to deposit the April 1948 rental within the prescribed period. Carbungco moved for execution of the judgment, but the respondent Judge, Rafael Amparo, denied the motion, citing a deposit made shortly after the deadline. Carbungco's motion for reconsideration was also denied. 3. The Petition: Carbungco filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court, seeking to compel Judge Amparo to issue an order for the execution of the Municipal Court's judgment. The petition argues that the failure to deposit the rental within the ten-day period mandated by Rule 72, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, is a violation that grants the appellee the right to execution, leaving the court no discretion to extend the period or excuse the delay. The Court also considered whether the failure to deposit was deliberate and intentional, noting Foz's lack of explanation and her status as a potential intruder rather than a regular tenant.
Issue(s)
Whether the ten-day period for depositing rentals under Rule 72, Section 8 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. Whether a trial court has discretion to deny a motion for execution if the delinquent rental deposit is made after the deadline but before the court resolves the motion.
Ruling
The petition for mandamus is granted. The respondent judge, or any judge presiding over Branch V of the CFI of Manila or any other branch handling civil case No. 2886, is commanded to order the execution of the appealed judgment rendered by the Municipal Court of Manila, requiring the defendant Vicenta Foz to vacate the premises in question. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the provision of Rule 72, Section 8 of the Rules of Court is mandatory and must be complied with strictly. The rule dictates that the appellant must deposit the rental for the previous month within the first ten days of the succeeding month to prevent the immediate execution of the appealed judgment. In this instance, the April 1948 rental was due on or before May 10, but the deposit was only made on May 13. The Court emphasized that the law prescribes a specific period to protect parties and provide clear procedural guidance. Failing to enforce this strict timeline would lead to confusion regarding how long a delay might be tolerated. Thus, the right of the appellee to execution arises the moment the ten-day period expires without the required deposit. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that the trial court is stripped of discretion to extend the deposit period or relieve the appellant of the consequences of their delay. Once the violation occurs, the issuance of a writ of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. The fact that the deposit was made shortly after the deadline does not cure the default or restore the stay of execution. The Court further noted that even under Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, which requires 'deliberate' non-payment for ejectment, Foz did not merit protection because she was an intruder or squatter who had ignored the lower court proceedings. There was no evidence or explanation provided to show that the delay was anything other than intentional. Consequently, the respondent judge erred in denying the execution, as the right of the petitioner to possess the property during the appeal had become enforceable.
Main Doctrine
Failure to make the deposit of rentals within the period fixed by law, however short the delay, gives the appellee the right to execution of the judgment pending appeal, which the court is bound to grant and enforce.