Agustin v. De la Fuente
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The City of Manila, through its Mayor, sought to alleviate congestion in its downtown districts by establishing a central market for vendors and peddlers. This involved remodeling existing buildings on Osmeña Park, appropriating P52,500 for the project. Upon completion of the remodeling, streets in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz were cleared of vendors, with most being assigned stalls in the new Central Market. 2. Procedural History: The Mayor recommended the establishment of the Central Market, and the Municipal Board initially approved the plan and the release of funds. However, a faction within the board, opposing the Mayor, later amended the ordinance to reallocate the funds for school buildings. The Mayor vetoed this amendment. Subsequently, the opposing members of the Municipal Board initiated a legal action to prevent the conversion of the buildings into a market. 3. The Petition: The petition, filed by Segundino Agustin and others, sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Mayor from converting the Osmeña Park buildings into a central market. Petitioners argued that the power to establish a public market resides solely with the Municipal Board, not the Mayor, citing Section 2444(z) of the Revised Administrative Code. However, the Court found that the remodeling and establishment of the market were already consummated acts at the time of the petition, rendering prohibition an inappropriate remedy.
Issue(s)
Whether the writ of prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent the conversion of buildings into a central market when the remodeling and establishment of the market have already been consummated. Whether the Mayor of Manila has the authority to establish a public market.
Ruling
The petition is denied without special pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the availability of the writ of prohibition: The Court held that prohibition is a preventive remedy intended to restrain acts about to be done, not to undo acts already accomplished. In this case, the remodeling of the buildings for the central market was completed by July 1, 1948, and vendors were subsequently cleared from the streets and assigned stalls in the new market. The establishment of the Central Market was a consummated act. Even if the petitioners argued that toilet facilities were inadequate or stall holders were still constructing booths, these were considered mere details of a completed project. The city engineer certified the buildings were completely remodeled and ready for occupancy by July 1, 1948, and the city treasurer confirmed vendors were ejected from streets on July 10, 1948, assigned places, and doing business therein. Therefore, the preventive remedy of prohibition was no longer available as the act sought to be prohibited had already been consummated. The Court cited Cabanero vs. Torres (61 Phil., 522) and U.S. vs. Hoffman (4 Wall., 158, 161) to support the principle that prohibition cannot undo accomplished acts. On the Mayor's authority to establish a public market: While the petition was denied on the ground that prohibition was not the proper remedy due to the consummated act, the underlying issue of the Mayor's authority was implicitly addressed by the Court's refusal to grant the writ. The petitioners' argument that only the municipal board had the power to establish a public market under Section 2444(z) of the Revised Administrative Code was raised. However, the Court did not explicitly rule on this specific grant of power, focusing instead on the procedural bar to the remedy sought. The fact that the Court did not grant the prohibition, despite the petitioners' claim regarding the Mayor's lack of authority, suggests that the Court found the procedural defect to be dispositive of the case.
Main Doctrine
A writ of prohibition is a preventive remedy and cannot be used to undo acts already accomplished. If the act sought to be restrained has already been consummated, prohibition is no longer available.