Argos v. Veloso
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The petitioner, Francisco Argos, was the pre-war justice of the peace for the municipality of Opon, Province of Cebu. Upon liberation, he resumed his position under a temporary appointment. However, he was subsequently replaced by three other individuals, with the respondent Dominador Veloso taking the position last on October 15, 1946. Procedural History: The petitioner initiated this quo warranto action in the Supreme Court on July 12, 1948, seeking his reinstatement to the position of justice of the peace and the ouster of Dominador Veloso. The respondents raised defenses of prescription and abandonment. The Supreme Court considered Rule of Court 68, section 16, which mandates that actions for ouster must be commenced within one year after the cause of ouster or the right to hold office arose, a rule previously upheld in Abeto vs. Rodas and Tumulak vs. Egay. The Petition: The petitioner sought reinstatement to his former judicial position through a quo warranto action. The Court found that the petition was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period, even if the dispossession date is considered October 15, 1946. Furthermore, the Court found evidence of abandonment, citing the petitioner's employment in the Surplus Property Commission from October 26, 1946, to January 24, 1948, and his surrender of insurance policies, which demonstrated an inability to perform his judicial duties and an implied relinquishment of the office. The petition was dismissed.
Issue(s)
Whether the action for quo warranto is barred by prescription. Whether the petitioner abandoned his office by accepting other employment.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The action is barred by prescription and the petitioner's subsequent acts showed abandonment of the office.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court held that the action for quo warranto is barred by prescription, citing Rule 68, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that such actions must be commenced within one year after the cause of ouster or the right of the plaintiff to hold office arose. The Court reiterated its ruling in Abeto vs. Rodas and Tumulak vs. Egay that this one-year period applies to public officers and is a valid limitation. On the issue of abandonment of office: The Court found that the petitioner's subsequent acts demonstrated abandonment of his office. From October 26, 1946, to January 24, 1948, he worked in the Surplus Property Commission as a skilled laborer and clerk-typist. Furthermore, on February 12, 1947, he surrendered his policies to the Government Service Insurance System and received their cash value. The Court reasoned that accepting employment incompatible with the duties of a justice of the peace, even if due to economic necessity, constitutes abandonment. This aligns with decisions in Floresca vs. Quetulio and Potot vs. Bagano.
Main Doctrine
An action for quo warranto must be commenced within one year after the cause of ouster or the right of the plaintiff to hold office arose. Furthermore, accepting employment incompatible with a public office may constitute abandonment, thereby forfeiting the right to the original office.