Llamoso v. Ferrer
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Following the elections of November 11, 1947, Vicente Ferrer was proclaimed mayor-elect of Lumban, Laguna, with a plurality of 363 votes over Lorenzo Llamoso. Llamoso filed a quo warranto proceeding, alleging Ferrer's disqualification due to lack of legal residence. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Laguna declared the position vacant, finding Ferrer ineligible. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed Ferrer's ineligibility but declined to award the position to Llamoso, stating he had not received the popular verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance. The Petition: Two petitions for certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court: one by Ferrer challenging his disqualification, and another by Llamoso arguing he should be declared elected.
Issue(s)
Whether Vicente Ferrer was disqualified from holding the office of mayor-elect due to lack of legal residence. Whether Lorenzo Llamoso, as the candidate with the next highest number of votes, is entitled to the office upon the disqualification of the winning candidate.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that Vicente Ferrer was ineligible for the office of mayor-elect. Consequently, the election was declared a nullity, and Lorenzo Llamoso was not entitled to the office.
Ratio Decidendi
On the disqualification of Vicente Ferrer: The Court of Appeals found that Ferrer lacked the required six months' residence in Lumban, Laguna, as mandated by Section 98 of Republic Act No. 180 (Revised Election Code). While Ferrer invoked a prior ruling, the Court found that the judgments concerning his exclusion from the registry list, though rendered close to the election and subsequently declared moot by the Supreme Court, did not conclusively establish his qualifications. In the absence of contrary evidence showing he possessed the required residence, the finding of ineligibility by the Court of Appeals was sustained, consistent with Section 2174 of the Administrative Code and Section 98 of Republic Act No. 180. On the entitlement of the candidate with the next highest votes: The Court held that when a winning candidate is disqualified, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes is not automatically entitled to the office. The Court cited Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil., 238) which distinguished between contests based on fraud or irregularities and those based on ineligibility. In cases of ineligibility, the election of the plurality winner is invalid, but this does not mean the office can be transferred to another candidate. Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 permits any registered candidate to contest an ineligible person's right to a position through quo warranto, without stipulating that the contestant will be proclaimed. American precedents were also cited, stating that a plurality of votes cast for an ineligible candidate does not entitle the next highest candidate to be declared elected; instead, the election fails to make a choice, rendering the election a nullity and leaving a vacancy.
Main Doctrine
When the winning candidate is disqualified, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes is not entitled to the office; instead, the election is considered a nullity, leaving a vacancy.